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The Crisis in Crimea and the Principle of Non-Intervention  
Russell Buchan and Nicholas Tsagourias 
Abstract 
 
During the civil unrest in Ukraine in early 2014 Russia began supplying rebel groups in 
Crimea with military equipment, deployed military forces into Crimea and encouraged and 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƌŝŵĞĂ ?ƐƐĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶĨƌŽŵhŬƌĂŝŶĞ ?This ĂƌƚŝĐůĞĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ
between February and March 2014 constitutes unlawful intervention and not a use of force. 
It reaches this conclusion by, first, exploring the meaning and content of the principles of 
non-intervention and the non-use of force and then, second, by examining ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ
justifications namely, that it intervened at the request of hŬƌĂŝŶĞ ?Ɛcompetent authorities, to 
protect endangered Russian citizens and to ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƌŝŵĞĂ ?Ɛclaim to self-determination.  
The overall aim of this article is to highlight the content and meaning as well as the legal 
boundaries of the principle of (non)intervention as an international legal norm distinct from 
the prohibition against the use of force.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since independence in 1991 political life in Ukraine has been dominated by tensions 
between pro-Western and pro-Russian parties. After a period of relative stability, tensions 
resurged in November 2013 when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych reneged on his 
promise to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) and instead 
decided to forge closer cooperation with Russia.
1
 His decision sparked protests on the 
ƐƚƌĞĞƚƐŽĨhŬƌĂŝŶĞ ?ƐĐĂƉŝƚĂů<ŝĞǀĂŶĚďǇŵŝĚ-February 2014 the situation had escalated 
considerably, resulting in violent clashes between protesters and police which left over 100 
people dead and many more injured.
2
 In an attempt to end the political crisis, an agreement 
brokered by the EU was signed by President Yanukovych and opposition leaders on 21 
February 2014. The agreement provided for a return to the 2004 Constitution, limitations on 
presidential powers, the formation of a coalition government and early presidential 
elections.
3
 This deal failed to ease tensions and on 22 February 2014 President Yanukovych 
fled Ukraine claiming threats to his life.  On the same day, the Ukrainian Parliament 
dismissed him from office.
4
 
 
In ĞĂƌůǇDĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ‘ƵŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƌŵĞĚŵĞŶ ?5 arrived in Crimea, an autonomous region of 
Ukraine which was part of Russia until 1954 and home to a large population of ethnic 
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ?ZƵƐƐŝĂŶWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚsůĂĚŝŵŝƌWƵƚŝŶĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞǁĞƌĞ ‘ůŽĐĂůƐĞůĨ-defencĞƵŶŝƚƐ ?
                                                          
1
 <ĞĞƐŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ?-24, 53080.  
2
 <ĞĞƐŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? ? 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 <ĞĞƐŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ?-8.
5
 UN Deputy Secretary-General, UNSC Verbatim Record (1 March) UN Doc S/PV.7124, 2. 
 3 
that had been established in order to protect the ethnic Russians in Crimea from violence.
6
 
/ƚǁĂƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞƵŶŝƚƐǁĞƌĞ ‘ƐƉŽƚƚĞĚƵƐŝŶŐƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
equipment and military vehicles registered for the Russian Black Sea FleĞƚŝŶƌŝŵĞĂ ? ?7 giving 
rise to allegations that they were being supplied with military equipment by Russia.
8
 It was 
also claimed that Russian military personnel had been deployed into Crimea to operate 
alongside these so-called local self-defence groups, exceeding the terms of the 1997 Black 
Sea Fleet Agreement which allows Russia to maintain naval bases and station troops in 
Crimea
 9
 Although initially Russia denied all involvement in Crimea, President Putin later 
ĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ ‘ĚŝĚďĂĐŬƚŚĞƌŝŵĞĂŶ self-ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐ ? by providing them with 
military equipment and by deploying Russian military personnel into Crimea to support 
them.
10
 After deployment and in conjunction with the local self-defence units, Russian 
troops ƋƵŝĐŬůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ‘ĨƵůůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽůŝŶƚŚĞƌŝŵĞĂ ? ?11   
 
Following the arrival of military forces in Crimea, the Parliament of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea announced that it would hold a referendum to determine whether 
Crimea should remain part of Ukraine or join Russia. On 16 March 2014 a referendum was 
                                                          
6
 Vladimir WƵƚŝŶ ? ‘sůĂĚŝŵŝƌWƵƚŝŶŶƐǁĞƌĞĚ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ?YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞ^ŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? )
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6763.  
7
 ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶDĂƌǆƐĞŶ ? ‘dŚĞƌŝƐŝƐŝŶƌŝŵĞĂ PŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>ĂǁWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Heidelberg Journal of 
International Law 367, 370.  
8
 EĞǁƐ ? ‘>ŝƚƚůĞ'ƌĞĞŶDĞŶŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶ/ŶǀĂĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ?014) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-26532154.  
9
 ZĞƵƚĞƌƐ ? ‘K^dĞĂŵ^ĂǇƌŝŵĞĂZŽĂĚďůŽĐŬ'ƵŶŵĞŶdŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĚƚŽ^ŚŽŽƚĂƚdŚĞŵ ? ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? )
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-osce-idUSBREA2B1C120140312.  
10
 Annual Special Direct Line interview with Putin, broadcast on many TV channels and radio stations, 17 April 
2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7034; ,ƵĨĨŝŶŐƚŽŶWŽƐƚ ? ‘WƵƚŝŶĚŵŝƚƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶ^ŽůĚŝĞƌƐtĞƌĞŝŶƌŝŵĞĂ ?^ůĂŵƐ
tĞƐƚ ?ƐĨŽƌZŽůĞŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞƌŝƐŝƐ ? ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? )http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/17/putin-
ukraine_n_5165913.html.  
11
 William ,ĂŐƵĞ ? ‘h< ?ƐZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ^ŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? )
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uks-response-to-the-situation-in-ukraine.  
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held and Crimea voted overwhelmingly in favour of acceding to Russia.
12
 A Security Council 
resolution declaring the referendum unlawful was vetoed by Russia, with China abstaining. 
The Ukrainian Government declared the referendum illegal and the Ukrainian Parliament 
dissolved the Crimean Parliament. On 17 March 2014 the Crimean Parliament declared 
independence and voted in favour of accession to Russia. On the same day, Russia 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚƌŝŵĞĂĂƐ ‘ĂŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĂŶĚƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?13 On 18 March 2014 Russia 
and Crimea signed a treaty that absorbed Crimea into Russia.
14
 The General Assembly 
adopted a resolution declaring that the accession constituted a violation of international law 
and should not be recognised.
15
 Indeed, the EU and US imposed sanctions against 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨƌĞƐĐŝŶĚŝŶŐƌŝŵĞĂ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽ
Russia and restoring the status quo ante.
16
 
 
ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐwere denounced by states and international organisations as a violation of 
the principle of sovereignty or more generally as a violation of international law
17
 but 
without identifying which specific international norm(s) Russia had transgressed.
18
 Legal 
commentators instead opined that ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ actions violated Article 2(4) of the United 
                                                          
12
 <ĞĞƐŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? ? 
13
 Ibid, 53241-2. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 GA Res 262 (2014). 
16
 <ĞĞƐŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ?-2.  KŶƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐƌĞŐŝŵĞƐĞĞEĞǁƐ ? ‘,Žǁ&ĂƌĚŽhĂŶĚh^
^ĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶZƵƐƐŝĂ'Ž ? ? ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? )http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28400218.  
17
 &ŽƌƚŚĞh ?ƐĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƐĞĞ ‘dŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐŽŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ ? ? ?
March 2014) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141291.pdf.  See 
also the statements made by various Security Council members in UN Doc S/PV.7124 (1 March 2014) and UN 
Doc S/PV.7125 (3 March 2014). 
18
 For example tŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƵŶĐŝůĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ǁ ?ĞƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĐŽŶĚĞŵŶƚŚĞƵŶƉƌŽǀŽŬĞĚǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by the Russian Federation and call upon the Russian Federation 
ƚŽŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁŝƚƐĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ ? ? ‘^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ,ĞĂĚƐŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞŽƌ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ ? ? ?
March 2014) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141372.pdf. See 
generally the statements of the members of the Security Council; UNSC 7124
th
 Meeting (1 March 2014) UN 
Doc S/PV.7124.  
 5 
Nations (UN) Charter, which prohibits the use of force in international relations.
19
 Other 
commentators ĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŵŽƵŶƚĞĚƚŽĂŶĂƌŵĞĚĂƚƚĂĐŬǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ
meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter or that they may qualify as an act of aggression.
20
 
Russia however maintained that its conduct was lawful under international law because 
troops were deployed: at the request of the legitimate President of Ukraine (Mr 
Yanukovych); in order to protect the large number of Russian citizens in Crimea against 
threats to their lives;
21
 and because it was in ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨƌŝŵĞĂ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƐĞůĨ-
determination.
22
 
 
dŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞŝƐƚŽĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƚŚĞůĞŐĂůŝƚǇŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞearly 
stage of the crisis that is, from February to March 2014. More specifically, this article will 
ĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƚŚƌĞĞŝƐƐƵĞƐ P ? )ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚƚŽƌĞďĞůŐƌŽƵƉƐŝŶƌŝŵĞĂ ?
 ? )ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŽƌŝŵĞĂ ? ŶĚ ? )ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌĂŶĚ
subsequent recognition of Crimean statehood.  
 
                                                          
19
 Mary-Ellen K ?ŽŶŶĞůů ? ‘hŬƌĂŝŶĞ/ŶƐƚĂ-^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ PhŬƌĂŝŶĞƵŶĚĞƌ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? )Opinio 
Juris http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/07/ukraine-insta-symposium-ukraine-international-law/; Daniel Wisehart, 
 ‘dŚĞƌŝƐŝƐŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞĂŶĚƚŚĞWƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞhƐĞŽĨ&ŽƌĐĞ P>ĞŐĂůĂƐŝƐĨŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ
2014) EJIL: Talk! http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-crisis-in-ukraine-and-the-prohibition-of-the-use-of-force-a-legal-
basis-for-russias-intervention/; James 'ƌĞĞŶ ? ‘dŚĞŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝŵĞĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Journal of the Use of Force 
and International Law 3; Marxsen (n 7); Antonello dĂŶĐƌĞĚŝ ? ‘dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌŝŵĞĂ PYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ
Relating to the Use of &ŽƌĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Questions in International Law 5, 8. 
20
 Thomas Grant, Aggression against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility, and International Law (Palgrave, 2015) 
chapter 2.  
21
 Putin (n 6). See further the remarks of the Russian Foreign Minister to the Security Council: UN S/PV.7134 
(13 March 2014).  
22
 ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƚŽƚŚĞhE ? ‘ƌŝŵĞĂŶƉĞŽƉůĞŚĂĚĂƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞŝƌĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?ĂƐ
well as an equal right to self-determination  ?  principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.  The Russian 
Federation was not disputing the principle of territorial integrity, but when it became impossible to enjoy such 
rights within a single State, people could seek the right to self-determination, which is ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŝŶƌŝŵĞĂŶŽǁ ? P
UN SC/11319 (15 March 2014).  
 6 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the scope and content of the 
principles of (non)intervention and the non-use of force. These two principles are often 
employed interchangeably as if synonymous but this article demonstrates that despite their 
common origins they differ normatively as well as ontologically. On that basis, this article 
ĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚfalls within the scope of the principle of (non) intervention. 
Section 3 then goes on to ĂƐƐĞƐƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝďůĞ
intervention because they were either ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŽďǇhŬƌĂŝŶĞ ?ƐůĂǁĨƵůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐor 
because they were designed to protect Russian nationals who were threatened with 
violence. Section 4 appraises the legality of ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛclaim that it supported Crimea ?Ɛ claim 
to self-determination. This ĂƌƚŝĐůĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛconduct cannot be justified and 
constitutes unlawful intervention.   
 
2. The Principle of Non-Intervention  
 
The principle of non-intervention commands a long pedigree in international law
23
 even if its 
content remains somehow under-explained.
24 
For example, Article 8 of the 1933 
DŽŶƚĞǀŝĚĞŽŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞZŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚƵƚŝĞƐŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞƐĚĞĐůĂƌĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘no state has the 
                                                          
23
 In the Nicaragua case Sir Robert Jennings noted that the principle of non-ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ‘ŝƐǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚŽůĚĞƌ
than any of the multilateral treaty regimes in question [i.e. the UN ŚĂƌƚĞƌƌĞŐŝŵĞƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽĨŽƌĐĞ ? ? ?Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ 
Rep 14 paras 534-535. 
24
  ‘ ?d ?ŚĞƌĞŝƐƉƌŽďĂďůǇŶŽďƌĂŶĐŚŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁǁŚŝĐŚ ƐƐŽĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚto encourage the sceptic as that 
mass of contradictory precedents, dogmatic assertions, and vague principles which are collected under the 
ĐŽŵŵŽŶŚĞĂĚŽĨ “ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ZŽďĞƌƚ:ĞŶŶŝŶŐƐ ? ‘dŚĞĂƌŽůŝŶĞĂŶĚDĐůĞŽĚĂƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?AJIL 82. Percy 
tŝŶĨŝĞůĚ ? ‘dŚĞ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? W23) 3 British Yearbook of International Law 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ƌĞĂĚĞƌ ?ĂĨƚĞƌƉĞƌƵƐŝŶŐWŚŝůůŝŵŽƌĞ ?ƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƵƉŽŶŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ŵŝŐŚƚĐůŽƐĞƚŚĞďŽŽŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
impression that intervention may be anything from ĂƐƉĞĞĐŚŽĨ>ŽƌĚWĂůŵĞƌƐƚŽŶ ?ƐŝŶƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞŽĨŽŵŵŽŶƐƚŽ
ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨWŽůĂŶĚ ? ) ?
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ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŽƌĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?dŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨŶŽŶ-
intervention has also been included in a number of legal instruments, although not in the 
UN Charter. However, it has been the subject of a number of General Assembly resolutions; 
resolution 2131(XX) on the Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of the Independence and Sovereignty; resolution 2625 
(XXV) on Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which 
specifically ĂĨĨŝƌŵƐƚŚĞ ‘ĚƵƚǇŶŽƚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞŝŶŵĂƚƚĞƌƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
any State, in accordance with tŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌ ?;25 and resolution 36/103 on Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal affairs of States.
26
 These 
resolutions together with the other instruments mentioning this principle
27
 including 
juridical opinions were relied upon by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case to affirm the customary 
law status of the principle of non-intervention.
28
  
 
2.1 The Concept of (Non)Intervention  
 
                                                          
25
 GA Res 2625 (1970), Principle 3.  
26
 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of 
Their Independence and Sovereignty (21 December 1965) UN Doc A/RES/20/2131; Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, Principle C, (1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference in the Internal affairs of States (1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/103. 
27
 For example Article 19, Charter of Organisation of American States 1948. 
28
 Nicaragua (n 23) para 202, 204. 
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What, then, is ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶKƉƉĞŶŚĞŝŵ ?ƐŽĨƚĞŶƋƵŽƚĞĚĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?intervention is 
 ‘dictatorial interference ... in the affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining 
ŽƌĂůƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ?29 According to the ICJ: 
 
the principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or 
indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited 
intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each 
State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty to decide freely  Q
Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such 
choices, which must remain free ones. The element of coercion, which 
defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention is 
particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force.
30
 
  
 
From these definitions one can glean the two main components of the concept of 
intervention: coercion and sovereignty. The first component describes the type of 
interference that is required whereas the second describes the domain within which such 
interference needs to take place in order to amount to intervention.  
 
                                                          
29
 Lassa Lauterpacht, Oppenheim, International Law: Volume I  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?&Žƌ:ĞŶŶŝŶŐƐĂŶĚtĂƚƚƐ ? ‘ƚŚĞ
interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the state intervened 
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ZŽďĞƌƚ:ĞŶŶŝŶŐƐĂŶĚĚĂŵtĂƚƚƐ ?KƉƉĞŶŚĞŝŵ ?Ɛ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Law (1996) 432. 
30
 Nicaragua (n 23) para 205.  
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It is important then to explain the meaning and content of these two elements. Coercion 
ĚĞŶŽƚĞƐ ‘ŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚĞƐƚŚĞǁŝůůŽĨa state in order to extract 
some advantage or concession.
31
 Put differently, coercion involves actions or behaviours 
that compromise the free will of the state and force the affected state to do something or 
to abstain from doing something against its will. It is not the means and methods used to 
exert coercion that matter but the purpose for which they are employed namely, to 
compromise or subordinate the will of the other state. Means and methods may vary and 
include military, political or economic means, they may be physical or non-physical such 
as cyber ones and they may be direct or indirect as the ICJ noted in the Nicaragua case.
32
 
The Friendly Relations Declaration defined indirect intervention as the organizing, 
assisting, fomenting, financing, inciting or tolerating subversive, terrorist or armed 
activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state or 
interference in civil strife in another state
33
 and the ICJ opined that financial support, 
training, supplying arms and the provision of intelligence and logistical support to rebel 
groups falls within the non-intervention principle.
34
    
 
The second component - that of sovereignty - refers to the domain within which such 
interference is exerted. According to the ICJ, it should target the sovereign prerogatives of a 
state in its external and internal affairs. However it is difficult to determine the totality of 
sovereign prerogatives that may be affected by intervention because, as the PCIJ opined in a 
                                                          
31
 Myres S McDougal and Feliciano P &ĞůŝĐŝĂŶŽ ? ‘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽĞƌĐŝŽŶĂŶĚtŽƌůĚWƵďůŝĐKƌĚĞƌ PdŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů
WƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ>ĂǁŽĨtĂƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Yale Law Journal 771, 779; W Michael Reisman, Nullity and Revision 
(1971) 839-40; Philip <ƵŶŝŐ ? ‘/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?WƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, paras 25-6. 
32
 Ibid, 205. 
33
 Friendly Relations Declaration (n 26). 
34
 Nicaragua (n 23) para 242. 
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ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ǁŚĂƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƐŽǀĞƌŝŐŶƉƌĞƌŽŐĂƚŝǀĞĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶƚŚĞ
development of international relations.
35
 The ICJ has offered examples of matters that fall 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƉƌĞƌŽŐĂƚŝǀĞƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚ
cultural system and the formulation of foreign policy but they are not exhaustive.
36
 Put in 
simple terms, intervention is the crossing of physical, political, economic or other borders as 
defined by sovereignty.  
 
All the above reveal the close relationship between the principle of (non)intervention and 
sovereignty: intervention is defined through the prism of sovereignty and, conversely, 
sovereignty is defined through the prism of intervention. To explain, if sovereignty is  ‘ƚŚĞ
right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs wiƚŚŽƵƚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?,37 non-
intervention as the absence of interference in the sovereign authority and structures of the 
state is its substantiation and manifestation. Conversely, intervention denotes the 
ƵƐƵƌƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇĞŝƚŚĞƌďǇůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐŝƚƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŝƐƐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ
fall under its sovereign prerogatives or by displacing its authority.
38
 As the ICJ put it, the 
non-intervention principle is protecting ƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ ?ŽĨĂƐƚĂƚĞ.39   
 
 
                                                          
35
 Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, PCIJ Rep Series B No. 4 (1923) 23.  
36
 Nicaragua (n 23) para 205. ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ&ƌŝĞŶĚůǇZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ‘[e]very State has an inalienable 
right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another 
^ƚĂƚĞ ? ?Friendly Relations Declaration (n 26). 
37
 Nicaragua (n 23) para 202.  
38
 WŝƚŵĂŶWŽƚƚĞƌ ? ‘> ?/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĞŶƌŽŝƚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůDŽĚĞƌŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Hague Academy of International 
Law 616. See also Robert J Vincent, Non-Intervention and International Order (1974) 325. 
39
 Nicaragua (n 23) para 202.  
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2.2 Distinguishing Intervention from the Use of Force  
 
If intervention is an elastic concept that describes forms of coercive interference into a 
ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƉƌĞƌŽŐĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞŝƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĞǆƚƌĞŵĞŽƌƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŵŽƐƚ
effective means of exercising such interference. Inevitably, this state of affairs has caused 
confusion. Often intervention is used interchangeably with the use of force or the same 
facts are used to signify both intervention and the use of force. In the Nicaragua case for 
example the ICJ opined that a violation of the non-ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŝƐ ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ
obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force ?.40  The Court also determined that 
acts which breach the principle of non-ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ‘ǁŝůů also, if they directly or indirectly 
involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of non-use of force in 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?41 Similarly, the Court characterised the presence of Ugandan troops 
on DRC territory and the support Uganda provided to rebels as violations of both the non-
use of force and the non-intervention norm but, finally, it concluded that ƚŚĞ ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞƵŶůĂǁĨƵů
military intervention by Uganda was of such magnitude and duration that the Court 
considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force expressed in Article 
 ? ?ƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌ ? ?42 
 
                                                          
40
 Ibid, para 205. 
41
 Ibid, para 209.  
42
 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (2005) ICJ Rep 
para 165. 
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It is important then to explain the differences between the concepts of intervention and use 
of force. Although intervention and the use of force share common origins in that they both 
derive from and are attached to the principle of state sovereignty, gradually they separated 
from each other. First, ontologically, intervention has been constructed around the notion 
of coercion whereas the use of force has been ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? 
in the sense of physical destruction or human loss and injury.
43
 Secondly, normatively, 
intervention and the use of force acquired their own legal formulation and became 
independent legal postulates. 
  
An excursion into the development of the norm prohibiting the use of force is instructive in 
this respect. This norm - currently enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter - is the result 
of a long process of legal and political endeavours to limit or prohibit  war in inter-state 
relations.
44
 War, according tŽůĂƵƐĞǁŝƚǌ ?s ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ŝƐĂŶĂĐƚŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞƚŽ
ĐŽŵƉĞůŽƵƌŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƚŽĨƵůĨŝůŽƵƌǁŝůů ? ?45 Although it is evident from this definition that 
intervention and war share the element of coercion, they also differ in that central to war 
and constitutive of war is the act of violence. The act of violence not only differentiated war 
from intervention ontologically but also stigmatised war because of its direct, immediate 
and destructive effects.
46
 As a result, in political and legal thinking war was treated as a 
                                                          
43
 &ŽƌŝŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? ‘ ?ŝ]t does not matter what specific means  W kinetic or electronic  W are used to bring it about but 
ƚŚĞĞŶĚƌĞƐƵůƚŵƵƐƚďĞƚŚĂƚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽĐĐƵƌƐŽƌŝƐƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚ ? ?zŽƌĂŵŝŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?War, Aggression and Self-
Defence (2011) 88 ?&Žƌ^ŚĂǁ ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? )hEŚĂƌƚĞƌ ‘ĐŽvers situations in which violence is employed which 
ĨĂůůƐŚŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨǁĂƌ ? ?DĂůĐŽůŵ^ŚĂǁ ?International Law (2014) 815.   
44
 See Article 10-13 Covenant of the League of Nations; Article 1 of the Pact of Paris (1928). See further 
ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ'ƌĞĞŶǁŽŽĚ ? ‘dŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨtĂƌŝŶDŽĚĞƌŶ/ƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 283, 301ff.  
45
 Carl von Clausewitz, On War http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch01.html. 
46
 Edward <ĞĞŶĞ ? ‘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů,ŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞKƌŝŐŝŶƐŽĨƚŚĞDŽĚĞƌŶWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?
Review of International Studies 1077; Brendan ^ŝŵŵƐ ? ‘ĨĂůƐĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŝŶƚŚĞ>ĂǁŽĨEĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŝŶ^ŝŵŵƐĂŶĚ
DJB Trim (eds), Humanitarian Intervention (2013) 89.  
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separate phenomenon leading to its normative separation from intervention as the 
persistent efforts to regulate or abolish war demonstrate. ǀĞŶŝĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ǁĂƌ ?ǁĂƐ
substituted by the more inclusive term  ‘ƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞ ?, a use of force is defined as such by the 
element of violence. This is exemplified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. What this Article 
prohibits is violence namely, the infliction of deprivations upon a state in the form of 
 ‘ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽůŝĨĞĂŶĚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚe use of the military or equivalent 
instruments.
47
 It is interesting to note in this respect that a Brazilian proposal to also include 
within the definition of Article 2(4)  ‘the threat or use of economic measures in any manner 
ŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁĂƐƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ
committee
48
 because it tried to link intervention with the use of force.
49
 If Article 2(4) is 
defined by violence, all other interference that is coercive and targets the sovereign domain 
of a state falls outside this Article and under the concept of intervention. As Vincent 
observed, intervention has become  ‘a word used to describe the sorts of behaviour not 
covered by Article 2(4) and hence non-intervention a rulĞŶŽƚƚŽďĞĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?50  
 
This reveals another feature of their normative decoupling in that the prohibition of the use 
of force is codified whereas the prohibition of intervention is not codified
51
 although it has 
been mentioned on numerous occasions in General Assembly resolutions. Still, the General 
                                                          
47
 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963) 362. For similar approaches see Bruno 
Simma, Daniel -Erasmus Khan, Greg Nolte and Andreas Paulus (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (2012) 208-10; Lauterpacht (n 29) 202; Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice 
(1982) 100- ? ? ? ?KůŝǀĞƌƂƌƌ ? ‘hƐĞŽĨ&ŽƌĐĞ ?WƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, paras 18-19. 
48
 UNCIO VI, 334, 609 (our emphasis); Simma et al, ibid, 208-9. 
49
 UNCIO VI, 563, 558-9. Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States A/5746 (1964), para 56. 
50
 Vincent (n 38) 234. 
51
 Nicaragua (n 23) para 202. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter is about the allocation of comptecnes between the 
UN and member states and it is not about intervnetion in the sense used here.  
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Assembly treated the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force in separate 
resolutions whereas the Friendly Relations Declaration - which declares the main principles 
that should inform inter-state relations - treats the non-use of force and non-intervention 
prohibitions as distinct and independent postulates.
52
 Furthermore and notwithstanding the 
lack of clarity that may exist,
53
 a comparison between the acts falling under the principle of 
the non-use of force and those falling under the principle of non-intervention indicates that 
the meaning of the term  ‘force ? was reserved only to armed force whereas non-intervention 
involves non-forcible acts.
54
 For instance, the General Assembly views the act of organizing, 
assisting, fomenting, financing, inciting or tolerating subversive, terrorist or armed activities 
as a use of force when the ensuing acts involve armed violence
55
 but as intervention when 
they do not involve armed violence. Similarly, the 'ĞŶĞƌĂůƐƐĞŵďůǇ ?ƐĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĚĞĨŝŶĞƐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĂƐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚĂƐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?56 
 
Further indication of the distinctiveness of the two norms is provided by the fact that, for 
many, the prohibition of the use of force is a jus cogens norm
57
 whereas the principle of 
non-intervention is not generally regarded as having attained this status.
58
  
                                                          
52
 GA Res 1815(XVII) para 3.  
53
 As Lowe observed,  ‘[i]t achieved doctrinal coherence and purity at the expeŶƐĞŽĨĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ ? ? 
sĂƵŐŚĂŶ>ŽǁĞ ? ‘The Principle of Non-ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ PhƐĞŽĨ&ŽƌĐĞ ?, in Colin Warbrick and Vaughan Lowe eds The 
United Nations and Principles of International Law: Essays in Honor of Michael Akehurst (1994) 66, 73. 
54
 Robert Rosenstock,  ‘The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations: A Survey ? (1971) 65 AJIL 713, 724-725; Dino <ƌŝƚƐŝŽƚŝƐ ? ‘dŽƉŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĞƐŽĨ&ŽƌĐĞ ? ?ŝŶD^ĐŚŵŝƚƚĂŶĚ:
Pejic (eds), International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultiness: Essays in Honour of Yoram Dinstein 
(2007) 68. See also UN Doc A/6799 (1967). 
55
  ‘ǀĞƌǇ^ƚĂƚĞŚĂƐƚŚĞĚƵƚǇƚŽƌĞĨƌĂŝŶĨƌŽŵŽrganizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife 
or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present ƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚŝŶǀŽůǀĞĂƚŚƌĞĂƚŽƌƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞ ? ? 
56
 'ZĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ‘ŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞďǇĂ^ƚĂƚĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
ŚĂƌƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐƐĞƚŽƵƚŝŶƚŚŝƐĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? ). 
57
 See references at footnote 19. 
 15 
 
dŚĞ/: ?Ɛinterpretation of the principle of non-intervention and the non-use of force is also 
instructive in this regard. Although the ICJ has occasionally and on a conceptual level used 
the notions of intervention and use of force interchangeably,
59
 when it was required to 
assess the international legality of specific factual scenarios it regarded the notions of 
intervention and use of force as appertaining to distinct legal principles. This is clearly 
illustrated in the Corfu Channel case where the ICJ determined that ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƵŶĂƵƚŚŽƌŝǌĞĚ
deployment of warships into Albanian's territorial sea was regarded as intervention against 
the will of the Albanian government, rather than an unlawful use of force.
60
 Even in the 
Nicaragua case ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ/: ?ƐĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞconcepts of intervention and the use of 
force was at its most pronounced, as the Court moved away from this conceptual discussion 
and focused upon the particulars of the case in hand, it tried to match facts and situations 
with either the norm on the use of force or the norm on intervention,
61
 thereby treating 
these principles as complementary, concluding that those measures adopted by the US 
which did not involve the use of force (for example economic measures or support to armed 
bands which do not subsequently use force) were unlawful according to the non-
intervention principle.
62
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
58
 DĂǌŝĂƌ:ĂŵŶĞũĂĚĂŶĚDŝĐŚĂĞůtŽŽĚ ? ‘dŚĞWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨEŽŶ-/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Leiden Journal of 
International Law 345. 
59
 See text accompanying footnote 40. 
60
 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 35. Although the ICJ explained that 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚ ‘ĂŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨ ĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?Ɖ ? ) ?ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚĚŝĚŶŽƚĂĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚĞŽŶƚŚĞ
basis of Article 2(4); see Theodore ŚƌŝƐƚĂŬŝƐ ? ‘/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ^ĞůĨ-,ĞůƉ ? ?ŝŶ<ĂŶŶĞůŝĞƌ ?dŚƌŝƐƚĂŬŝƐĂŶĚ^
Heathcote (ed), The ICJ and the Evolution of International Law: The Enduring Impact of the Corfu Channel Case 
(2012) 219-220.   
61
 Nicaragua (n 23) para 201. 
62
 ibid paras 241-2, 245  
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What transpires from the preceding discussion is that intervention and the use of force are 
part and parcel of a multi-faceted legal framework established in international law to 
protect state sovereignty in its various facets 
63
 but where each legal principle has its own 
separate content and normative standing and describe different phenomena impacting 
upon state sovereignty.
64
  
 
 
2.3 ƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛonduct  
 
ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐhŬƌĂŝŶĞthus need to be considered against this background. It is 
widely acknowledged that Russia wanted to prevent closer ties between Ukraine and the EU 
and to cancel the Association Agreement. For this reason, Russia imposed a number of 
economic measures against Ukraine.
65
 Since the aim of those measures was to influence the 
                                                          
63
 Jennings and Watts (n 29) 382.  
64
 ƐKƉƉĞŶŚĞŝŵĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ ? ‘ ?ǁ ?ŚŝůĞ customary rules of international law relating to intervention have now to a 
considerable extent to be considered alongside the more general prohibition on the use of force, intervention 
ŝƐƐƚŝůůĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?; Jennings and Watts, ibid, 429; Derek W Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 
(1958) 44-51; Kritsiotis (n 54 ) ? ? ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?:ĂŵŶĞũĂĚĂŶĚtŽŽĚĂƐƐĞƌƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶŽǁĂĚĂǇƐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ
on the use of force is not generally thought of in terms of non-intervention but as a self-standing chapter of 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ? ?:ĂŵŶĞũĂĚĂŶĚWood (n 58) 359. 
65
 /ƚǁĂƐƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?Ĩ ?ƌŽŵƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?ZƵƐƐŝĂƵŶĚĞƌƚŽŽŬĂƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨĐŽĞƌĐŝǀĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇĂŝŵĞĚĂƚ
changing the political calculations of President zĂŶƵŬŽǀǇĐŚ ? ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƌ>ŝůŝĂ^ŚĞǀƚƐŽva, Senior Associate, 
DŽƐĐŽǁĞŶƚĞƌ ?ĂƌŶĞŐŝĞŶĚŽǁŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWĞĂĐĞ ?ƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ƵŐƵƐƚƚƌĂĚĞǁĂƌ
with Ukraine, trying to force the former President Yanukovych to reject the Association Agreement with 
ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ? ?,ŝƐǆĐĞůůĞŶĐǇ ŶĚƌŝŝ<ƵǌŵĞŶŬŽ ?hŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶĐƚŝŶŐŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƚŽƚŚĞh< ?ƐƉŽŬĞŽĨĂ ‘ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
different 'wars' ? a customs war, a gas war, a milk war, a meat war, cheese war, a chocolate war", which "the 
Russians started against Ukraine with the solemn purpose of pursuing us to postpone and then refuse 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ Union Committee - Sixth Report The EU and Russia: before 
and beyond the crisis in Ukraine, House of Lords (10 February 2015) 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/11502.htm para 179. 
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external relations of Ukraine and to coerce Ukraine into adopting a different course of 
action, they constitute unlawful intervention.
66
  
 
ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐhƉƉĞƌ,ŽƵƐĞŽĨWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂůƐŽĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ
 ‘[i]n connection with the extraordinary situation that has developed in Ukraine 
and the threat to citizens of the ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ QƚŽ use the Armed Forces 
of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine until the social and political situation 
in ƚŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŝƐŶŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞĚ ? ?67 The wŽƌĚ ‘ƵƐĞ ?ŵĂǇƐŝŐŶŝĨǇĂǁŚŽůĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐďƵƚthe 
mere deployment of troops or the threat of deploying troops falls under the prohibition of 
intervention; it is only if the deployment of troops is accompanied with the use of force or 
the threat of force that it violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter on the non-use of force. At 
that stage, the resolution amounted to unlawful intervention since its purpose was to 
coerce Ukraine into adopting a certain course of conduct. Indeed, as the Security Council 
debates reveal, ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝůŵĞŵďĞƌƐĚŝĚŶŽƚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ as a threat 
of force but instead as a threat to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine.
68
  
 
Regarding the provision of military equipment to local self-defence units, this action did not 
amount to an indirect use of force because the equipment was not used to perpetrate acts 
                                                          
66
 Nicaragua  ?Ŷ ? ? )ƉĂƌĂ ? ? ? ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ&ƌŝĞŶĚůǇZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ‘[e]very State has an inalienable 
right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another 
^ƚĂƚĞ ? ?Friendly Relations Declaration (n 26). 
67
 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20353  
68
 UN Doc S/PV.7124 (1 March 2014). See in particular the interventions of the representatives of the United 
States, United Kingdom and France.   
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of violence according to the 'ĞŶĞƌĂůƐƐĞŵďůǇ ?Ɛ definition of indirect use of force.69  The 
supply of weapons constituted instead a violation of the non-intervention principle because 
it emboldened the material capabilities of the rebel group vis-à-vis Kiev and thus 
undermined the capacity of the central government to regulate and organise its domestic, 
sovereign affairs. It is interesting to note that there is a subtle yet important difference 
between the ICJ ?Ɛ and the General Assembly ?Ɛdefinition of indirect use of force. For the ICJ, 
the provision of military equipment is an indirect use of force,
70
 regardless of how it is used 
by the rebel groups, whereas according to the General Assembly ?Ɛ resolution an indirect use 
of force occurs only where those weapons are used by rebel groups to commit acts that 
involve the threat or use of force. It is very difficult to decipher the reasons for such 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶďƵƚŝĨƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚe Friendly Relations Declaration constitutes 
customary law is taken into account as well as the limitation of the non-use of force 
principle in the Declaration to that of armed violence, the ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛinterpretation as to 
what amounts to an indirect use of force is more consistent with the rationale of the 
Declaration.  
 
In relation to the entry and presence of Russian military personnel on Ukrainian territory 
without its authorisation - whether as part of the local self-defence forces or the entry and 
presence of Russian military itself  W it amounts to unlawful intervention.71 According to the 
Friendly Relations Declaration, one type of prohibited intervention is an  ‘ĂƌŵĞĚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?
but this provision needs to be interpreted in conjunction with the principle of the non-use of 
                                                          
69
 Friendly Relations Declaration (n 26) Principle C, para 2. 
70
 Nicaragua (n 23) para 228. 
71
 UN Doc A/5746 (1965) para 45. 
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force included in the same resolution. An armed intervention may signify a whole range of 
activities from the entry and presence of military personnel to the actual use of force by 
them. For this reason, the critical question is whether the dispatch of military personnel 
involves the use of force in the sense of armed violence. In the case at hand, the military 
personnel that established operational control over Crimea did so without the use of 
violence.
72
 As President Putin stated,  ‘/ĐĂŶŶŽƚƌĞĐĂůůĂƐŝŶŐůĞĐĂƐĞŝŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨĂŶ
intervention ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂƐŝŶŐůĞƐŚŽƚďĞŝŶŐĨŝƌĞĚĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŶŽŚƵŵĂŶĐĂƐƵĂůƚŝĞƐ ? ?73 
Consequently, ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛdeployment of military personnel into Crimea must be characterised 
as intervention insofar as it adversely impacted upon the authority structures of Ukraine.
74
 
More specifically, ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨƚƌŽŽƉƐŝŶƚŽƌŝŵĞĂƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚhŬƌaine from 
exercising its authority over that region and in general usurped its authority.  
 
There were reports of an incident on 7 March 2014 where Russian military personnel 
stormed a Ukrainian command post near Sevastopol,  ‘ƌĂŵŵ ?ŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞŐĂƚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚforcing 
entry into the base.
75
 Although this was reportedly done without any violent confrontation 
between the Russian and the Ukrainian troops guarding the base,
76
 one could say that the 
damage to the base amounted to violence within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. However, there is a near consensus that Article 2(4) embraces a de minimis 
                                                          
72
 It is important to reiterate that our analysis extends only to the initial deployment of Russian troops into 
ƌŝŵĞĂŝŶĞĂƌůǇDĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ?ƵŶƚŝůƌŝŵĞĂ ?ƐĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĂƐĂƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ state on 17 March 2014.  
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 Address by President of the Russian Federation (18 March 2014) http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889. 
74
 /ŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǀĞŝŶ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽtĞůůĞƌ ‘ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŚĂǀĞĐƌĞĂƚĞĚƐƉĂĐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌŽ-Russian local 
authorities in Crimea to displace the lawful public authorities of Ukraine. Legally, this clearly amounts to a 
significant act of intervention - indeed, aƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƵŶŝƚƐĂƌĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ?ŝƚŝƐĂĐĂƐĞŽĨĂƌŵĞĚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?
Marc Weller ? ‘ŶĂůǇƐŝƐ PtŚǇZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƌŝŵĞĂŵŽǀĞ&ĂŝůƐ>ĞŐĂůdĞƐƚ ?, BBC News (7 March 2014) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26481423.  
75
 EĞǁƐ ?hŬƌĂŝŶĞƌŝƐŝƐ PZƵƐƐŝĂǁĂƌŶƐh^ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ‘ŚĂƐƚǇ ?ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? )
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26492053#TWEET1065567.  
76
 ibid.  
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threshold namely, that if the violence is minimal, it falls outside this article.
77
 Consequently, 
minimal uses of force fall within the definition of intervention.  
 
dŽƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛaforementioned conduct did not amount to a use of force it 
cannot be an armed attack as the Ukraine Association of International law opined
78
 because, 
per the ICJ in the Nicaragua ĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĂƌŵĞĚĂƚƚĂĐŬĞǆƚĞŶĚƐŽŶůǇƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞ
ŵŽƐƚŐƌĂǀĞĨŽƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?79 Likewise, ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĐĂŶŶŽƚĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽĂŶĂĐƚ
of aggression.
80
 It has been claimed that the use of Russian forces stationed in Ukraine in 
contravention of the 1997 Black Sea Fleet Agreement is an act of aggression according 
Article 3(e) of the 1974 General Assembly resolution on the Definition of Aggression.
81
 As 
Article 1 of the Definition of Aggression explains,  ‘ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞ ?Ănd 
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  Mary-Ellen K ?ŽŶŶĞůů ? ‘ ?dŚĞWƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞhƐĞŽĨ&ŽƌĐĞ ? ?ŝŶEŝŐĞůtŚŝƚĞĂŶĚŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶ,ĞŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ?ĞĚƐ ) ?
Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law (2013) 102. For a similar approach see Oliver 
Corten, The Law against War  ?,Ăƌƚ ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚďĞůŽǁǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
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alterative view that Article 2(4) does not embrace a de minimis ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚƐĞĞdŽŵZƵǇƐ ? ‘dŚĞDĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ
 ‘&ŽƌĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞJus ad Bellum  W ƌĞ ‘DŝŶŝŵĂů ?hƐĞƐŽĨ&ŽƌĐĞƐǆĐůƵĚĞĚĨƌŽŵhEŚĂƌƚĞƌ ? ? ? ) ? ? 
(2014) 108 AJIL 159. 
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 Nicaragua (n 23) para 191. 
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 See the Statement of the Ambassador of the Ukraine of the Security Council; UN Doc S/PV.7124 (1 March 
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Nordic, Baltic and Visegrad countries met in Narva on 6-7 March 2014 and issued a joint statement regarding 
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ƐƚŽŶŝĂŶDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐ ? ?-7 March 2014).  
81
 According to Article 3(e) of General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the Definition of Aggression (1974) 
ĂŶĂĐƚŽĨĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ ‘dŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨŽŶĞ^ƚĂƚĞǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŽƌĂŶǇĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŝŶƐƵĐŚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?^ĞĞ
Aurel ^Ăƌŝ ? ‘hŬƌĂŝŶĞ/ŶƐƚĂ-Symposium: When does the Breach of a Status of Forces Agreement amount to an 
Act of AggressioŶ PƚŚĞĂƐĞŽĨhŬƌĂŝŶĞĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂĐŬ^ĞĂ&ůĞĞƚ^K& ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? )Opinio Juris 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/06/ukraine-insta-symposium-breach-status-forces-agreement-amount-act-
aggression-case-ukraine-black-sea-fleet-sofa/. Also see Ukrainian Association of International Law 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/appeal-from-the-ukrainian-association-of-international-law/.  
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as it states in the preamble it is  ‘ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĂŶĚĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐĨŽƌŵŽĨƚŚĞŝůůĞŐĂůƵƐĞŽĨ
ĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?82 dŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘ƵƐĞŽĨĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ ? in Article 3(e) should involve the 
use of grave force to constitute aggression. To the extent that Russian forces were deployed 
in contravention of the agreement but they did not use force in the sense of armed violence 
causing death, injury or destruction, that action falls below the use of force threshold and 
consequently does not constitute aggression. It constitutes instead unlawful intervention 
since the aim was to coerce the Ukrainian government in addition to being a breach of the 
referent treaty.  
 
/ŶĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŵŽƵŶƚĞĚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶďƵƚƚŚĞimmediate question is 
whether there are any grounds according to which they can be justified.  
 
3. Permissible Intervention 
 
Russia maintained that its actions were justified because they were consented to by the 
legitimate authorities in Ukraine and that they were designed to protect its nationals. For 
this reason, in this section we ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƚŚĞůĞŐĂůŝƚǇŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐŝŶƚƵƌŶŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ
ascertain whether its actions were permissible under international law.
83
  
 
3.1 Intervention by Invitation 
                                                          
82
 GA Res 3314 (1974). 
83
 For a discussion of justified interventions see Jennings and Watts (n 29) 439 W47. 
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ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƚŽƚŚĞhEDƌŚƵƌŬŝŶproduced a letter dated 1 March 2014 and 
ƐŝŐŶĞĚďǇDƌzĂŶƵŬŽǀǇĐŚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĐĂůůĞĚŽŶƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ ‘ƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞĂƌŵĞĚ
forces of the Russian Federation to establish legitimacy, peace, law and order, and stability 
and to defend the people of UkraiŶĞ ? ?84  
 
International law has accepted interventions (military or otherwise) at the invitation of the 
ŚŽƐƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŝŶǀŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĂŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶwill. 85 
State practice is quite rich in this regard
86
 with recent incidents including the US action in 
Iraq against ISIL at the request of the Iraqi government
87
 or the French and Chadian 
intervention in Mali in 2012-2013 to support the Malian government in its fight against 
Islamist groups.
88
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 UN S/PV.7125 (3 March 2014) 4.  
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 Nicaragua (n 23) para 246; Article 20, Articles on State Responsibility For Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(2001).  
86
  ‘h<DĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐŽŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?BYIL  ? ? ? ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽƚŚĞƐƵŵŵĂƌǇŽĨƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐůĞŐĂů
position on military action in Iraq against ISIL at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/military-action-
in-iraq-against-isil-government-legal-position/summary-of-the-government-legal-position-on-military-action-
in-iraq-against-isil; Jennings and Watts (n 29) 435; Louise Doswald-ĞĐŬ ? ‘dŚĞ>ĞŐĂůsĂůŝĚŝƚǇŽĨDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
Intervention by Invitation of the GoverŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?BYIL 189. 
87
 Letter dated 20 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2014/691 (22 September 2014), ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ ?ŝ ?ƚŝƐ
for these reasons that we, in accordance with international law and the  relevant bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, and with due regard for complete  national sovereignty and the constitution, have requested the 
United  States of  America to lead international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds, with our 
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ? ? 
88
 Identical letters date 11th January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of France to the UN addressed 
to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council; UN Doc S/2013/17 (14 January 2013) and 
for Chad see UN Doc S/PV.6905 (2 January 2013), 12. See also Karine Bannelier and Theodore Christakis, 
 ‘hŶĚĞƌƚŚĞhE^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐtĂƚĐŚĨƵůǇĞƐ PDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶďǇ/ŶǀŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞDĂůŝĂŶŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?
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In order for consent to play such a role it should be valid, free, precede the action and be 
specific. Consent is valid if it is granted by an authority that can express the will of the state 
for international law purposes. This does not necessarily mean that consent should be given 
by the person or the organ that is constitutionally empowered to give such consent. This is a 
domestic constitutional law question which international law does not have the authority or 
the means to determine. Instead, what is critical for international law is for the consent to 
be issued by a person or an organ that represents the state for international law purposes. 
In the Eastern Greenland case for example the PCIJ held that a statement by the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister bound his country even if it was made without authority.
89
 The 
requirement that the request should be issued by an organ representing the state is 
different from the institution of attribution in the law of state responsibility. For example, 
whereas the conduct of regional authorities can be attributed to a state for purposes of 
state responsibility,
90
 regional authorities do not represent the state when it comes to 
inviting foreign troops as will be seen later.  
 
That said, in times of constitutional crisis or political unrest the question is whether the 
authority that issues the request is competent to do so under the circumstances prevailing 
at the time. It is in such cases that the internal situation may be taken into consideration. As 
the International Law Commission ŽƉŝŶĞĚ ?ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŝůůďĞŵĂĚĞŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞ
rules of international law relating to the expression of the will of the State, not to mention 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƌƵůĞƐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ ?ŝŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐĂƐĞƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁŵĂǇƌĞĨĞƌ ? ?91  
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 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Judgment of 5 April 1933, PCIJ Series A/B, 21, 71. 
90
 Article 4, ASR (2001).  
91
 ILC Yearbook (1979) Vol. II, Part Two, 112. 
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In situations of constitutional turmoil, international law has traditionally given prominence 
to the factual criterion of effective control.
92
 In other words, only the government or 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƚŚĂƚĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇĂŶĚƉĞŽƉůĞcan issue such a 
request regardless of its representative or democratic character. However international 
practice gradually moved away from the effective control test not only because the internal 
constellation of power may not always be clear-cut but also because of changing political 
attitudes towards states and governments placing more weight on their legitimacy and, in 
particular, their democratic legitimacy.
93
 For example, during Apartheid the government of 
South Africa was not allowed to invite foreign states because of its internal political system 
even though it exercised effective control over the territory.
94
 Conversely, the government 
of Mali was deemed competent to issue an invitation as the internationally recognised 
democratic (and so legitimate) government of Mali even though it had lost control over a 
large part of its territory and, actually, invited foreign troops in order to re-establish such 
control.
95
 It therefore transpires that variables other than effective control are now being 
used in order to determine who can issue such request.  
 
With regard to the case at hand, the question of whether Mr Yanukovych had the power to 
issue such a request was settled when the Ukrainian Parliament voted to remove Mr 
                                                          
92
 Article 1, Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933. See further ƌĂĚZŽƚŚ ? ‘^ĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?
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 SC Res 2085 (2012). 
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Yanukovych from office.
96
 First, he did not exercise effective control over the country, 
having left for Moscow.
97
 ^ĞĐŽŶĚ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞDƌzĂŶƵŬŽǀǇĐŚ ?ƐƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚhe remained 
the legitimate President of Ukraine because the vote to remove him from office violated the 
Ukrainian constitution, he was not deemed to be the legitimate President by many states 
and international organisations that recognised instead the new government. In light of the 
above, it can be said with reason that Mr Yanukovych was not the right authority to issue 
such a request. If this is correct, the other qualifications attached to consent  W that it should 
be expressed, be prior to the action and be specific - become redundant.  
 
If, for the sake of argument, Mr Yanukovych was still the lawful President, the fact that he 
fled to Russia from where he issued the request casts doubt as to whether his consent was 
given freely. It should be noted in this regard that his letter was not circulated in the UN as 
an official document. Finally, Mr zĂŶƵŬŽǀǇĐŚ ?Ɛ consent was not specific. His invitation to 
Russian troops to establish legitimacy, peace, law and order, stability and defend the people 
of Ukraine is too broad and indeterminate.    
 
Be that as it may, there is another overarching question in play namely, whether 
interventions by invitation are circumscribed by the right to self-determination in situations 
where the government and groups within a state struggle for political power.
98
 It has been 
                                                          
96
 In a letter by the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN it is stated that Mr Yanukovych is not the 
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 Marxsen (n 7) 379. 
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claimed that the principle of self-determination does not sanction interventions whose aim 
it to weigh in the power struggle and perhaps decide its outcome, something which is 
analogous to ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ?ƐŶĞƵƚƌĂůĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐĂĐŝǀŝůǁĂƌ ?99 
Consequently, invitations even by the legitimate government may amount to unlawful 
intervention if the purpose of the invited intervention is to shift the balance of power in the 
internal conflict. In the case at hand, one could say that even if the situation in Ukraine had 
not reached the level of civil war, the power struggle between Mr Yanukovych and his 
opponents divided the country sharply into opposing camps and thus Mr Yanukovych ?Ɛ
invitation of foreign troops with the purpose of deciding the internal power struggle would 
have been unlawful. It should be recalled that Mr Yanukovych invited Russian troops to 
restore legitimacy when both Russia and himself claimed that he remained the legitimate 
President of Ukraine something that was disputed by the opposition. The argument later 
shifted into claiming that RussŝĂ ?ƐĂŝŵwas not to return Mr Yanukovych to power but to 
have the Agreement of 21 February on constitutional reforms respected. In this case, one 
could say that the invitation of foreign troops would not affect the internal power 
competition but it is at the same time difficult to accept that the presence of troops from a 
country that so openly and robustly supported one side of the power struggle would not 
affect the implementation of this agreement and the power share it contained.     
 
Finally, the Russian Representative to the Security Council, Mr Churkin, also claimed that the 
invitation of Russian troops was solicited by the Crimean authorities.
100
 In international law 
there is broad agreement that no authority other than the government has the right to 
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100
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invite foreign forces. The ICJ in the Nicaragua case castigated the supposed right of an 
ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽŝŶǀŝƚĞƚƌŽŽƉƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ƚŚĂƚ would permit any State to intervene at any 
moment in the internal affairs of another State, whether at the request of the government 
ŽƌĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƋƵĞƐƚŽĨŝƚƐŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?101  
 
dŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƐƵĐŚŝŶǀŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĐĂŶĞƋƵĂůůǇĂƉƉůǇƚŽƐƵď-state authorities but 
the main reason why sub-state authorities cannot invite foreign troops is because they do 
not represent the will of the state. It is for this reason that Mr Churkin mentioned in the 
same breath Mr Yanukovych ?ƐŝŶǀŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?
 
/ŶƐƵŵ ?ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚit was invited into Ukraine by the deposed but legitimate 
President of Ukraine or by local authorities does not stand in international law.  
 
3.2 Intervention to Protect Nationals Abroad  
 
The second justification offered by Russia is that the deployment of its troops was for the 
protection of its citizens in Crimea against threats to their life and property. The protection 
of Russian citizens is enshrined in the Russian constitution. According to Article 61 (2) of the 
Russian ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂůůŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞŝƚƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĂŶĚ
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patronage beyond its boundaries. ?102 To that, Article 14.5 of the Russian Federal Law on the 
State Policy in Regard to the Fellow Citizens Residing Abroad should be mentioned 
ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ŝĨĂĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƐƚĂƚĞǀŝŽůĂƚĞƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚŶŽƌŵƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁĂŶĚ
human rights in regard to Russian expatriates, the Russian Federation shall undertake 
ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝǌĞĚďǇŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?103 Regardless of domestic 
law provisions, intervention to protect nationals abroad must comply with international law 
in order to be lawful.  
 
Interventions to rescue nationals threatened with injury or loss of life due to the actions of 
the host government or of groups in the host country have a long history.
104
 Their legality is 
premised on two alternative grounds: (i) host state consent or (ii) self-defence in the 
absence of such consent. 
105
 This is confirmed in ƚŚĞŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐĨŽƌ ‘EŽŶ-Combatant 
ǀĂĐƵĂƚŝŽŶKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚďǇĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞh< doctrine, the 
UK may launch a rescue operation with the consent of the host government but in the 
absence of consent such an operation can be justified on grounds of self-defence.
106
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Since we have already discussed the legal issues surrounding consensual intervention,
107
 we 
will move to the next justificatory ground: self-defence. This justification is based on certain 
readings of self-defence that are often used interchangeably. The first reading relies on the 
customary law of self-defence which, according to its proponents, has been preserved in the 
post-ŚĂƌƚĞƌƉĞƌŝŽĚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚ ?ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?of the UN Charter.108 Even 
if in the pre-Charter era states did not always justify their actions to protect nationals under 
the self-defence rubric, gradually self-defence became the sole legal basis upon which such 
operations were justified
109
 and this is definitely the case in the post-Charter period.
110
 For 
example, Israel relied on self-defence to justify its operation to free Israeli nationals held 
hostage at Entebbe
111
 and, similarly, the US relied on self-defence to justify its failed 
operation to free the US hostages from Tehran. In his message to Congress, President Carter 
ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ‘ ?ŝ ?ŶĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚŝƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝƐĂĐƚŝŶŐǁŚŽůůǇǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚƐƌŝŐŚƚŝŶ
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens 
where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to 
ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞŵ ? ?112  
 
 
The second reading of the self-ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƌĞůŝĞƐŽŶƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĂŶ ‘ĂƌŵĞĚ
ĂƚƚĂĐŬ ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐƚŚĂƚĂŶĂƚƚĂĐŬŽŶĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂŶĂƚƚĂĐŬŽŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ĂĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ
                                                          
107
 See also Rex ĞĚĂůŝƐ ? ‘WƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨEĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐďƌŽĂĚ P/ƐŽŶƐĞŶƚƚŚĞĂƐŝƐŽĨ>ĞŐĂů 
KďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Texas Journal of International Law 209, 221. 
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 Nicaragua (n 23) para 176. 
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 See generally Offutt (n 114). 
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 For state practice see Natalino Ronzitti, Rescuing National Abroad through Military Coercion and 
Intervention on Grounds of Humanity (1985). 
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 See the statement by the Israeli Ambassador to the UN, UN Doc S/PV 1939, (9/7/1976), 57, 59-60. 
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 US Department of State Bulletin (1980) No. 2039, 42-43. 
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based on social contract theories.
113
 According to this reading, there is no threshold on the 
gravity of the attack neither is a physical attack required but the deprivation of human rights 
would suffice.
114
  
 
In addition to consent and self-defence there is a third line of justification which suggests 
that rescuing nationals abroad does not violate the prohibition of the use of force because 
such operations are surgical intrusions that are not against the territorial integrity of the 
state or its political independence and, moreover, they reaffirm the UN purpose of 
protecting human rights.
115
 This line of argument places rescue operations outside the use 
of force paradigm.  
 
Although the legal status of such interventions has been questioned by certain legal 
commentators,
116
  ‘ƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĐĂŶďĞŵĂĚĞƚŚĂƚĂƌƵůĞŽĨĐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚional law is 
by now established ?117 permitting such interventions. However, they are subject to certain 
conditions: first, there must be an imminent threat of injury to nationals; second, the host 
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 Bowett (n 64) 91 ff; 'ƌĞĞŶǁŽŽĚ ? ‘^ĞůĨĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law 103, para 108. 
114
 Often it forms part of the proportionality calculus; Bowett (n 64) 93. As for the threshold see Nicaragua (n 
23) paras 191-195.  
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 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Processes. International Law and How we Use it (OUP, 1994) 220-1. 
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Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection: Special Rapporteur John ƵŐĂƌĚ ? ‘&ŝƌƐƚZĞƉŽƌƚŽŶŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ
WƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ?hEŽĐ ? ?E ? ? ? ? ? ? ? para 46 and UNGA, 55th Session, 6th Committee, 15th to 
24th meetings, 24 October  W 3 November 2000, UN Docs. A/C.6/55/SR.15-A/C.6/55/SR.24. Also see Ronzitti (n 
110) 62-72, 89-113; Simma et al (n 47) 226-228.   
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state should have failed or be unable to protect foreign nationals; and third, the operation 
should be proportional and serve no ulterior purpose.
118
  
 
With regard to ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵĂŶĚon the basis of the available information, we contend that 
none of the aforementioned conditions were satisfied. Even if certain groups had 
threatened Russian citizens or Russian officials, there was no indication that the danger was 
grave and imminent.
119
 During the debates in the Security Council, most representatives 
questioned the verity of Russian claims but not the existence of such a right.
120
 Moreover, 
although a large proportion of the Ukrainian population are ethnic Russians, that does not 
make them Russian citizens even if Russia was engaged in a process of issuing them with 
Russian passports. In this case, the genuineness of the Russian claim may be contested as it 
was contested in the case of Georgia.
121
 &ŝŶĂůůǇ ? ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ƐĞĞŵ ƚŽ ďĞ
proportional to any alleged threat.  
 
 
4. ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ^ƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨƌŝŵĞĂ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŽ^ĞůĨ-determination 
 
As was said at the beginning, Russia also claimed that its troops were deployed into Crimea 
to ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƌŝŵĞĂ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƐĞůĨ-determination.122 There is no doubt that self-determination 
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 Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
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were violations. See Russian Foreign Ministry Presents White Book on Human Rights Abuses in Ukraine, 
http://tass.ru/en/russia/730463.   
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 UN Doc S/PV.7125  (3 March 2014). 
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 Simma et al (n 47) 617. 
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 ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƚŽƚŚĞhE ? ‘ƌŝŵĞĂŶƉĞŽƉůĞŚĂĚĂƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞŝƌĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?ĂƐ
well as an equal right to self-determination  ?  principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.  The Russian 
 32 
is  ‘ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ of international law ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ/:ŚĞůĚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĂŶerga 
omnes obligation.
123
 The right to self-determination entitles a people living within a certain 
territory to determine the political and legal status of that territory by remaining within the 
existing state under a status of relative autonomy (internal self-determination), by 
becoming part of another state (integration) or by seceding from a state and creating a new 
state (external self-determination).
124
  
 
In order to determine the legality ŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚhe first question one needs to ask is 
whether the Crimeans constituted a self-determination unit that is, a  ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?The meaning 
of the ƚĞƌŵ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ŝƐ ‘ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ?125 but according to a UNESCO report, a number 
of characteristiĐƐĂƌĞ ‘ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚŝŶĂĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ )ŽĨĂƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?126 These 
include: a common historical tradition; racial or ethnic identity; cultural homogeneity; 
linguistic unity; religious or ideological affinity; territorial connection; common economic 
life. The report also notes ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉŵƵƐƚďĞŽĨĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŶƵŵďĞƌ ? ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌŽƵƉĂƐĂ
whole must have the will to be identified as a people or the consciousness of being a 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞ ‘ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐŽƌ ƚŚĞƌŵĞĂŶƐof expressing its common 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚǁŝůůĨŽƌŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ?127 If these criteria are applied to the case in hand, there 
can be little doubt ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝŵĞĂŶƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĨŽƌƐĞůĨ-determination purposes 
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because they are a defined population made up mainly of ethnic Russians living within a 
distinct territory and sharing a common language, culture and traditions.
 128
 Moreover, 
Crimea was recognised as an autonomous Republic within Ukraine.
129
  
 
/ĨƌŝŵĞĂŶƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?, the next question is whether they can exercise their right 
to self-determination. As was said above, self-determination can be realised in different 
ways but, because self-determination in the form of secession can destabilise states and 
endanger international peace and security,
130
 in the post-colonial era more emphasis is 
placed upon internal self-determination. Internal self-determination is about the protection 
of a ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĨƵůůƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐand often takes the 
form of autonomy within the existing state.
 131
 It has been claimed however that when a 
people is subjected to  ‘ŐƌŽƐƐ human rights violations ? and its very existence is threatened, 
 ‘ƚŚŝƐŵĂǇũƵƐƚŝĨǇĂĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶŽ-ƐĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƌƵůĞ ?132 and the people can opt for 
external self-determination by seceding from the state.
133
 This is called remedial self-
determination but the legal status of this rule is not accepted by all.  
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ŝŶƚŚĞ<ŽƐŽǀŽWƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ P ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁĂůůŽǁƐĨŽƌƐĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĂƉĂƌƚŽĨĂ^ƚĂƚĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛǁŝůů
only as a matter of self-determination of peoples, and only in extreme circumstances, when the people 
concerned is continuously subjected to most severe forms of oppression that endangers the very existence of 
the pĞŽƉůĞ ? ?Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the 
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Regarding Crimea, it was an autonomous republic within Ukraine; in other words, it had 
achieved internal self-determination. There was also no suggestion that the people of 
Crimea were being subject to severe human rights abuses ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ? ‘ŝƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĂŝŶ
motivation behind the move to secede was the long-held desire by many Crimean residents 
 W ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ Wto rejoin ZƵƐƐŝĂ ? ?134 In such 
circumstances unilateral secession cannot be justified according to the theory of remedial 
self-determination.
135
  
 
That being said, it is also true that international law neither prohibits nor authorises 
secession which is a political act and as the ICJ said in its Kosovo Advisory Opinion 
international law does not prohibit declarations of independence.
136
 This means that neither 
the declaration of independence nor the preceding referendum were illegal under 
international law although they may be illegal under domestic law. International law can 
only deal with the legal consequences of secession by recognising the new entity or by 
declaring the act of secession illegal and by calling upon states not to recognise the new 
entity if it emerged by violating norms of jus cogens.
137
 Indeed, the General Assembly 
ƉĂƐƐĞĚĂƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?ƉŽlitical independence, unity and 
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇŽĨhŬƌĂŝŶĞ ? ?Đalled upon  ‘all States to desist and refrain from actions 
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aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine, including any attempts to modŝĨǇhŬƌĂŝŶĞ ?ƐďŽƌĚĞƌƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚŽƌƵƐĞŽĨ
ĨŽƌĐĞŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƵŶůĂǁĨƵůŵĞĂŶƐ ? ?said  ‘ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ Q ?ŚĂƐ ?ŶŽǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ?and, finally, 
ĐĂůůĞĚƵƉŽŶ ‘Ăůů^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝǌĞĚĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŶŽƚƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞ
any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of 
Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum and to refrain from any action 
ŽƌĚĞĂůŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚĂƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌŝŶŐĂŶǇƐƵĐŚĂůƚĞƌĞĚƐƚĂƚƵƐ ? ?138  
 
What is interesting to note is that the General Assembly did not qualify the secession and 
annexation of Crimea as illegal; neither did it say that the secession violated international 
law. Also, when it said that the referendum had no validity it did not specify whether this 
refers to legal validity according national and/or international law as opposed to moral or 
political validity. Moreover, invalidity is about legal defects whereas voidance is about 
illegality.  The difference becomes evident if this resolution is compared to Security Council 
resolution 662 (1990) which ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƚŚĞĂŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ<ƵǁĂŝƚďǇ/ƌĂƋ ‘ŶƵůůĂŶĚǀŽŝĚ ?ĂŶĚ
called upon all states not to recognise the annexation.
139
 Finally, the General Assembly 
resolution calls upon staƚĞƐƚŽƌĞĨƌĂŝŶĨƌŽŵƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ĂůƚĞƌĞĚ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨƌŝŵĞĂďƵƚ
does not qualify it as unlawful.  
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Be that as it may, we are going to assess ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ƌŝŵĞĂ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŽƐĞůĨ-determination violated international law, which is the focus of 
this article.  
 
Russia galvanised secessionist feelings and moves by repeated claims that Crimea was 
historically, culturally and linguistically part of Russia and by declaring that Crimea would be 
permitted to accede to Russia if this was the outcome of the referendum.
140
 ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ
utterances and actions in this respect can be regarded as unlawful intervention because it 
challenged hŬƌĂŝŶĞ ?Ɛ sovereign authority over its territory and people and fettered its 
capacity to deal with this internal matter. For example, it destroyed the chances of holding 
meaningful negotiations with the Crimean authorities to perhaps further the internal self-
determination of Crimeans. This is a matter for the state and regional authorities to resolve 
and international law does not recognize any right of external actors to provide support or 
assistance in the exercise of the right to internal self-determination.
141
   
 
It should be noted in this regard that secessionist claims are often dependent on some form 
of external assistance in order to attain their objectives.
142
 It is for this reason that in 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁƐƚĂƚĞƐ ‘ĂƌĞƵŶĚĞƌĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŶŽƚƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ ?ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů
utterances or legislative action with the intent or likelihood of inciting sedition or revolt 
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ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?143 This has been reaffirmed in a host of General 
Assembly resolutions.
144
 Principle V of the Declaration on Friendly Relations which 
represents customary law is relevant here because it instructs states not to engage in any 
activity that compromises the territorial integrity or political unity of a state in assisting 
peoples to realise their right to self-determination provided that the parent state conducts 
itself in conformity with the principle of self-determination.
145
  
 
ZĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝŵĞĂĂƐĂŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƐƚĂƚĞ ?ŝƚŝƐƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ
recognition of a secessionist entity can be an act of intervention because the recognising 
state, by establishing legal and political relations with the secessionist entity, denies the 
sovereign authority of the parent state over such territory and people and affects the power 
structures within the parent state. The critical question is at which point recognition can 
constitute unlawful intervention. Recognition is unlawful when it is premature; that is, when 
the parent state has not politically, legally and factually conceded to secession but is still 
ĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶĂ ‘ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞ ?ƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝƚƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇĂŶĚƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĞŶƚŝƚǇ
from seceding.
146
 Although Ukraine did not mount a military struggle to retain Crimea due 
to its relative weakness vis-à-vis Russia, it did mount a political and legal struggle to retain 
ƌŝŵĞĂ ?ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇĚĞŶŽƵŶĐŝŶŐƌŝŵĞĂ ?ƐƐĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶĂƐƵŶůĂǁĨƵůĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇŝůůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ
and brokering international support for this position.  
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In conclusion, ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŽƌŝŵĞĂĂŶĚthe premature recognition of Crimea 
constituted unlawful intervention. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article has assessed ƚŚĞůĞŐĂůŝƚǇŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶƌŝŵĞĂĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚit 
began providing support to separatists in Crimea until the ŵŽŵĞŶƚŝƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƌŝŵĞĂ ?Ɛ
secession from Ukraine. ItƐŵĂŝŶĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐof supporting rebels, 
deploying troops and supporting and encouraging CƌŝŵĞĂ ?ƐƐĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶĨƌŽŵhŬƌĂŝŶĞ
constituted unlawful intervention and not an unlawful use of force as many commentators 
claim.  
 
The thrust of the argument is that intervention and the use of force are ontologically and 
normatively separate principles. They both derive from and protect the sovereignty of states 
but they protect different aspects of state sovereignty against different types of intrusion. 
Whereas the non-intervention principle refers to the political integrity of states protecting 
state sovereignty against external coercion, the non-use of force protects the physical 
integrity of states by protecting sovereignty against physical harm.  
 
 
 39 
Although there exists a complex network of international law principles and norms that 
protect state sovereignty and these are designed to capture different types of infraction of 
state sovereignty, the prohibition on the use of force has dominated legal debates at the 
expense of other principles and norms. In reaction to this, this article has brought to light 
the enduring relevance of the principle of non-intervention by explaining its meaning, 
content and scope against the current state of legal neglect that characterises the treatment 
of this principle.  
